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The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the political 
economic theory of regulatory policy in two ways. One is to examine 
regulation in relation to other policies that might be seen as 
alternatives to it. Existing theory argues that regulation is likely 
to be too particularistic and cumbersome to serve the efficiency 
objectives that constitute its justifications in welfare economics; 
however the relative performance of regulation in comparison with other 
approaches to the same types of problems has not been extensively 
explored. The second aspect of this paper is that it examines the 
relationship of the performance of regulation to the basic political 
structure of a country: whether legislatures are elected on the basis 
of proportional representation or from single-representative 
constituencies, and whether a country has a parliamentary system or 
separate, autonomous legislative and executive branches. By broadening 
the range of policies analyzed and the political institutions in which 
it operates, the possibility is created tor making useful international 
comparisons of the performance of alternative approaches to the market­
failure problems that are associated with regulatory policies. 
THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF REGULATORY POLICY 
by Roger Noll* 
Since 1 970, scholars in economics, law and political science 
have applied microeconomic models of political behavior to produce 
important new insights about the political causes of regulatory 
policies. Like much of the work in applied economics, research on the 
political economy of regulation normally addresses a specific policy 
question in a specific country, and hence, implicitly or explicitly, 
takes as given a particular set of political and economic institutions. 
Most of this research is by Americans, and so is baaed on assumptions 
about the political system that bold in few countries. Examples are 
the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches 
of government, the special features of the American Constitution 
(especially the due process amendment ),  and the structure of the 
American legislative system, Consequently, the generalizability of 
this work is dubious. 
This paper provides a step towards a more general political 
economic theory of regulation. First, it discusses the ways in which 
*Inetitute Profeeeor of Social Sciencee, California Inetitute of 
Technology. Exceptionally useful comments on an earlier draft were 
provided by Bruce Cain and J ohn Ferejohn. 
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alternative political institutions (e. g. proportional representation 
versus single-member geographic districts as a means of electing a 
legislature) might affect regulatory policy. Second, regulatory policy 
is examined in a broader context than is usual, but not so broad 
that it encompasses all public policies. The purposes of these 
extensions are to internationalize this field and to facilitate 
international comparisons of related policies. 
The premise of this paper is that a general political economic 
theory of regulation can provide useful insights about how policy is 
formulated, and how more effective policies might be adopted. This 
view is controversial. Some disagree with any attempt to 
internationalize the study of political institutions. Many scholars of 
comparative political and economic systems believe that the values, 
cultures and political structures of countries are so different that 
attempts to generalize across national boundaries are worse than 
useless -- they are perilous, for what appears to work in one context 
is likely to be disastrous in another. Another source of controversy 
is the belief that a comprehensive political theory of regulation for a 
specific country is a useful pursuit. For example, James Q. Wilson 
argues that no useful political generalizations across regulatory 
policies are likely to prove true. Of course, negative propositions 
cannot be proved, so these dissents amount to a warning that general 
theories of political behavior bear the burden of proof: they must 
provide nonobvious, empirically verifiable insights, 
This paper does not attempt such a proof because it is not 
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empirical, Nevertheless, it contains numerous theoretical conclusions 
that are susceptible to empirical tests. 
The theoretical perspective of �bis paper is distinctly that of 
microeconomics, or rational actor theory. The analysis builds upon the 
existing literature that explains regulatory policy as the result of 
actions by organized interest groups to obtain favorable 
redistributions of wealth. It departs from this approach in several 
ways, First, it incorporates mass political movements, organized by 
political entrepreneurs, as a potential countervailing force against 
organized interest groups. Second, it examines the role of uncertainty 
and incomplete information in decisions made by voters, politicians and 
bureaucrats. Third, it explores bow different electoral institutions 
produce different political incentives, 
The paper reaches several conclusions that are at variance with 
received wisdom, One is that the distributional orientation of 
regulation is not primarily due to the influence of organized special 
interests, but is a characteristic of representative democracy. 
Second, in the long run regulation may be less sensitive to 
particularistic distributional pressures than other types of public 
policies. Third, the political conditions that lead to cartelization 
by regulation should also lead to subsidies of the cartel, Fourth, the 
variance in regulatory policies in relation to the exhibited degree of 
protection of particularistic interests should be lower in countries 
that elect legislators by proportional representation, rather than from 
single-representative constituencies; however, the mean effect on 
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regulatory policies is indeterminate, as is the effect of parliamentary 
systems in comparison to the separation of powers between executive and 
legislative branches. 
The theoretical argument is laid out in Section II. A 
necessary preamble is to state the definitions and assumptions on which 
the theoretical argument is based. These are laid out in Section I. 
Section Ill provides a swmnary and conclusion. 
I. Preliminary Definitions and Assumptions 
In developing a political theory of regulatory policy, a 
necessary first step is to define regulation. Host of the 
literature on regulation adopts a relatively narrow definition: 
regulation consists of policies that are intended to correct for market 
failures by the promulgation and enforcement of rules constraining 
participants in a market. The litany of market failures includes 
natural monopoly, incomplete information, and external effects. A more 
narrow definition requires that the rules be written by a regulatory 
agency rather than in law by elected political leaders. Neither 
definition includes alternatives to regulation, such as corrective 
Pigovian taxes and subsidies. laws regarding liability and negligence, 
nationalization and public enterprise, the creation of new property 
rights and a market for exchanging them, such as, for example, 
marketable permits to emit pollutants, or legal self-regulation by 
industry of various forms, including European corporatism, the National 
Recovery Act in the U. S. during the 1 930s, and Italian syndicalism from 
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the same era. 
For our purposes, the broader definition is required, and the 
scope of analysis must include alteril";tives to regulation. The 
decision to change regulatory policy can usefully be separated �nto 
three choices. The first is the decision to take some action that 
alters the performance of a class of economic activities, where 
performance here refers to both economic efficiency and the 
distribution of wealth. The second is the selection of regulatory 
rules from among the policy instruments listed above. Third, once 
political decision makers decide to select rules, they must decide how 
much authority to delegate to an implementing organization. Regulatory 
laws can contain detailed rules, leaving to a bureaucracy the problem 
of enforcing and perhaps elaborating and clarifying them, but giving 
the agency little opportunity to make policy. Alternatively, laws may 
contain vague, general instructions to an agency, delegating to the 
professional bureaucracy or the courts the responsibility for making 
rules. The latter choice gives the agency or the court a substantial 
role in developing regulatory policy. 
Regulation is not alone in having this third step. For 
example, public enterprises can be more or less closely controlled by 
the political process. For example, western democracies differ in the 
autonomy of national broadcasting entities. In the United States, the 
postal system underwent a transition in the 1 970s from a ministry 
subject to close political control to a virtually independent public 
enterprise that is overseen by a new regulatory agency, the Postal Rate 
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CoDDDission. 
An important challenge to the political economic theory of 
regulation is to provide insight about the rationale for decisions at 
each stage. When analyzing the decision to intervene, the theory must 
incorporate the full range of policy instruments that can be used to 
change market outcomes. Hence, in his influential paper, Stigler adopts 
a definition of regulation that includes almost all forms of government 
activity, including commodity-specific taxes (the whiskey tax ) ,  tariffs 
and import quotas, subsidies (airport subsidies to benefit airlines as 
well as industry-specific subsidies, as in agriculture),  some kinds of 
public enterprise (airports are typically owned by government 
entities ) ,  and the more prosaic torms of regulation (controls on 
prices, entry, product quality and packaging, workplace safety. land 
use, and emissions of pollutants ).  
When analyzing choices at the second and third levels -- what 
form of instrument to use and how much authority to delegate -- a 
further challenge arises. We need to understand how the political 
implications of these choices differ. 
The roles and powers of elected political leaders, 
bureaucracies and courts differ substantially among nations, 
causing potentially important differences in the implications of a 
decision to create a regulatory authority. In the United States, the 
Constitution sets forth limitations to the procedures adopted 
by regulatory agencies, the authority of the legislative branch and its 
ability to delegate, and the rules an agency can promulgate. The 
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Constitution guarantees citizens equal protection under the law, and 
due process in matters that affect them significantly. The 
implications for regulation are that �ecisions must be based upon 
substantial evidence, affected parties must be given the right to 
participate in the process by submitting evidence and argument in 
support of their interests, decisions of an agency must be logically 
derived from its legislative mandate, and decisions are subject to 
judicial review should any affected party believe that these 
requirements have not been satisfied. 
In other countries, regulation need not be so cumbersome and 
decision makers so constrained; however, statutes can include complex 
procedural requirements and extensive Judicial review, such as the 
review of environmental policies by the administrative court in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Even in the United States, agencies 
differ in the extent to which authorizing legislation imposes 
procedural constaints beyond the minimum constitutional requirements. 
In each case, the question remains as to how political incentives 
affect choices regarding the extent of delegation and procedural 
requirements. 
The Behavioral Assumptions 
Microeconomic theory presumes that choice is rational and 
purposive that its purpose is to obtain some valued end. The 
objective of political leaders is presumably to secure political power. 
Usually this means maximizing the probability of winning an election 
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for public office; however some may seek to advance to a political 
position having greater power and status. In any event, the key point 
is that political incentives govern the choice of policy objectives, 
policy instruments, and assignments of responsibility for making 
detailed policy decisions among political leaders, the bureaucracy and 
the courts. Consequently, political economic theory must include a 
theory of the political consequences of a choice of policy. instrument 
an delegation. 
In western democracies, political success depends on the 
electorate. Hence, a political economic theory of public policy must 
be built on a theory of elections and, in particular, the relationship 
between policy and voting. This in turn requires behavioral theories 
of voters and candidates. 
Political economic theory assumes rational choice in 
elections, as elsewhere. Voters are assumed to engage in political 
activities (voting, working as volunteers, contributing to campaigns, 
lobbying ) as part of the quest to maximize personal welfare, subject to 
a budget constraint. Government can supply public and private goods, 
affect the prices and qualities of private goods, and alter personal 
income through taxation, through transfer payments, and by affecting 
factor prices. Political economic theory assumes that voters select a 
strategy for political participation that takes account of the many 
ways in which the political process can affect their welfare. 
The rationality assumption about voters is controversial. 
The alternative view is that voting behavior is affective and has no 
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policy significance. Each voter is identified with a rung on the 
socioeconomic ladder, and votes for the party or candidates appearing 
to be on the same rung. But information is incomplete, and so, as 
Edelman argues, voters can be misled by emotional appeals and symbolic 
issues. Elections then become competitions for power among elite 
groups; policy making divides the spoils among elites, rather than 
responding to the wishes of the electorate. Some hold that this makes 
the study of elections and voting behavior largely uninteresting and 
certainly pointless from a public policy point of view. The 
implications for regulatory policy are essentially Marxist: 
symbolically, regulation may be represented as protecting the 
population from some market failure, but in reality it maintains a 
cartel for a ruling elite (see, for example, Kolko on American railroad 
regulation ) .  
The competition between the two theoretical approaches ought to 
be resolved by testing which better explains the development of public 
policy. At another level, however, the two approaches have less 
difference than might appear at the surface. If political elites are 
not unified and homogeneous, competition among parties for informed, 
competing elites is a candidate for study using the rational choice 
approach. Perhaps many voters do not engage in political participation 
on the basis of rational choice; however, elections are decided, so to 
speak, "at the margin" - by the voters who have a stake in the choice 
-- as long as parties compete and elite groups have conflicts of 
interest. Elections may have little normative significance because 
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many voters face little or no real stake in the outcome. But elections 
will have significance in deciding which directions policy will take 
among competing elites. This makes studying the electoral foundations 
of public policy worthwhile. Even after the revolution. it will be 
useful to know bow policy outcomes differ among different democratic 
processes. 
The final important group of actors in the policy making drama 
is professional civil servants. The tenets of economic analysis 
require that they rationally pursue personal objectives. 
Unfortunately, there is considerable disagreement as to what 
bureaucrats maximize. The candidates are job security, permanent 
income (perhaps by obtaining better-paying private sector jobs ) ,  and 
political advancement. Another view is that the issue can be finessed: 
the bureaucracy can be assumed to execute more or less perfectly the 
commands of the political leadership. At the other extreme, Niskanen's 
influential theory assumes that agencies, in maximizing their 
discretionary budgets, possess so much power that they act as 
monopolists at appropriations time. This implies that bureaucrats, not 
politicians, industry or the general population, reap most of the 
profits from regulation. 
In this paper, we will assume that neither bureaucrats nor 
political leaders possess monopoly control over public policy. This is 
an assumption of inconvenience: it requires that political economic 
theory include both bureaucrats and politicians, and leaves as an 
empirical matter ascertaining their relative influence. As further 
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inconvenience, no restrictions will be placed on the motives of 
bureaucrats: they may seek security and the quiet life, greater 
political power within one agency or through promotion to another, or 
greater economic rewards in the private sector. 
Summary 
The preceeding discussion sets the stage for the next 
section. The important definitions and assumptions are as follows. 
The political economic theory of regulation deals with, tirst, the 
decision to intervene in a market, second, the decision to attack the 
problem by writing behavior rules, and third, the decision to create a 
regulatory agency, the decision about how much authority to 
delegate and how elaborate a procedural requirement to impose. 
Regulation refers to altering the performance of a market by 
promulgating and enforcing rules governing the production. qualitative 
attributes, entry and/or price of a good that is bought and made by 
others. All of the relevant actors are assumed to be rational and 
motivated by self-interest, whether voters, politicians, bureaucrats or 
participants in regulated markets. 
I I. The Political Economic Theory of Regulation 
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If  political officials are rational, the decision to  regulate 
must be based upon a realization of the performance characteristics of 
regulation. These effects can usefully be classified as either 
generic, applying ubiquitously, or particularistic, affecting a well­
defined subset of society. 
Breyer has introduced the notion of match and mismatch between 
regulatory objectives and the method used to achieve them. A mismatch 
occurs when the method is not effective for attaining the objective. 
Breyer's analysis assumes that the purpose of regulation is to correct 
market failures, but here no such assumption is made. Our concern is 
why the choice of regulation matches political incentives operating 
upon elected decision makers, regardless of the match with normative 
economic theory. Thus, the political economic theory of regulation 
must begin with a characterization of what political officials are 
likely to expect from regulation -- even a mismatch. 
The Effects of Regulation 
The most obvious characteristic of regulation is that it must 
change the economic efficiency of a regulated market. It must do so 
because it imposes costs: regulated firms must provide information to 
regulatory officials, keep informed about regulatory requirements, and 
maintain internal systems for assuring compliance (or, perhaps, optimal 
noncompliance ).  Even if regulation imposes a nonbinding constraint, 
the paperwork requirement alone alters the equilibrium in the regulated 
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market; however, applying a rationality assumption, it is implausible 
that an agency would be established to impose nonbinding constraints. 
If regulatory constraints are binding, the net efficiency effect of 
regulation can be positive or negative, depending on whether it 
ameliorates a market failure and the costs in doing so. This can 
usefully be termed the comparative statics effects of regulation: the 
net surplus generated by it. 
The second characteristic of regulation is its effects on 
dynamics: the speed with which a regulated market adjusts to a new 
equilibrium in response to changed conditions (demand, availability of 
resources, technological change, etc, ) .  Regulation slows change by 
creating an extra step in the process whereby an economic agent adjusts 
to changed circumstances. One way in which regulation slows change is 
to retard entry. Potential entrants must receive approval from 
regulators, a time-consuming process that also entails announcing 
intentions to incumbent competitors. 
Although retarding change is normally regarded as detracting 
from economic efficiency, Owen and Braeutigam point out that it does 
not necessarily do so. By retarding change, regulation reduces 
uncertainty. Exogenous shocks that upset market equilibrium are public 
goods, and can impose a net cost. One element of cost is associated 
with risk aversion, but there are others. Fluctuating markets may 
require frequent recontracting or other means of introducing 
flexibility into long-term relationships between buyers and sellers. 
If renegotiation is costly -- or if people do not like to bargain -- a 
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process that retards adjustment to  changed circumstances can produce 
net benefits. 
The third characteristic of regulation is that it creates and 
destroys wealth. This is a necessary companion to the other 
characteristics: changing the efficiency of a market and its response 
to changed circumstances affects the wealth associated with a market, 
But the wealth effects of regulation go beyond its efficiency aspects. 
First, they are more particularistic: regulation can redistribute 
wealth among various participants. Second, regulation can create or 
redefine property rights in ways that have no efficiency consequences, 
but that determine who captures the surplus generated in a market. 
Regulation creates and destroys wealth in numerous ways, 
described more completely in Noll and Owen. Here a few examples 
illustrate the general process. For instance, by retarding entry, 
regulation creates a property right in the status quo that has market 
value equal to the costs of gaining regulatory approval to enter. In 
addition, regulation benefits suppliers who are more adept at 
participating in the regulated market than at the unregulated 
equilibrium (number of firms, price, quality of product, available 
production method). For example, if regulation increases product 
quality, firms adept at producing high quality goods will experience a 
windfall. Regulation also enhances the wealth of entrepreneurs who are 
adept at dealing with govermnent in comparison to those whose skill is 
understanding production technology and market demand. Thus, regulated 
industries will have different winners and losers than they would 
without regulation, Consequently, the wealth of incumbents will 
depend on the continued presence of regulation. 
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A fourth characteristic of regulation relates t o  the process by 
which agencies establish and enforce rulea. Although western 
democracies differ according to the limits on decisions by elected 
political authorities and by bureaucrats, the latter are generally more 
constrained than the former. More specifically, regulatory agencies 
are more constrained by evidence than are political leaders and other 
administrative organizations. Evidence is generated by two principal 
sources: the agency itself, and participants in the regulated market 
who supply the agency with information. 
The dependence of regulatory agencies on evidence gives rise 
to rules regarding the weight accorded to evidence, the evidentiary 
requirements to sustain a court challenge to a decision, and the rights 
of outsiders to participate in the process (e. g. rules of standing). 
Regulatory agencies are more court-like than legislatures or other 
kinds of bureaucracies; however rules of evidence and standing in 
courts usually are more strict than in regulatory proceedings . 
The significance of procedural requirements is as follows. 
First, they affect the costs of effective participation: one must 
prove that the standing qualifications are satisfied, and muat submit 
information that satisfies evidentiary standards. Second, they affect 
the potential benefits from participation: because decisions depend 
upon evidence, a failure to participate runs the risk that no evidence 
will be submitted in support of a favorable decision, even if the 
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agency is disposed to make it. Third, they affect the character of 
participation: in contrast to processes with less strict evidentiary 
rules, technical information has a relatively higher value in 
comparison to more informal, personal activities, such as lobbying. 
Thus, economists, engineers. lawyers and scientists are more 
influential in regulatory decisions than in legislative activities or 
most other forms of executive decision making. 
The last characteristic of regulation is that creating a 
regulatory agency and embarking on a new regulatory program does not 
necessarily require that there be immediate winners and losers in the 
political struggle. When legislation is passed, its opponents have 
lost; however, as Fiorina argues, what they have lost, and whether 
there are compensating gains, is conjectural. 
Consider the approaches available to control pollution. When 
regulatory laws are passed, a polluter can expect higher costs, so in 
that sense is a loser. But the stringency of regulation remains in 
doubt -- and depends upon evidence and argument to be supplied by the 
firm. Moreover, once a firm has had standards adopted for its 
emissions, it has a de facto property right in a valuable resource 
waterways and airshede to dispose of waste. This is not available to 
potential entrants until they, too, can run the regulatory gauntlet -­
with, in all liklihood, more stringent requirements being applied to 
them than to incumbent firms. By contrast, consider two widely 
discussed alternative strategies for dealing with pollutants: an 
emissions tax or stricter laws regarding public nuisances. In both 
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cases, all polluting firms can expect losses, and no new entry 
barriers will provide partially off setting benefits. Indeed, if firms 
face generally lower abatement costs, either policy enhances the 
prospects of entrants. Thus, the enactment of either approach is an 
iunnediate lose for the losers. 
An alternative to economic regulation is public enterprise, 
either nationalizing existing companies or creating a publicly-owned 
competitor. Once again, this is more clearly a threat to the industry 
than the creation of public utility regulation to control their prices 
and profits. 
Although the five characteristics of regulation apply to all 
cases, the magnitude of their effect is controlled by the political 
leadership. The following examples illustrate means to vary these 
characteristics. 
The extent to which regulatory policy serves 
economic efficiency objectives can depend on 
whether regulators are required to undertake 
manadatory benefit-cost analyses of proposed rules. 
The degree to which regulation slows change 
depends on whether legislation creates a legal 
monopoly or contains a presumption in favor of 
competition, and on whether it writes rules related 
to performance or with respect to inputs and entry 
into a market. 
The manner in which regulation distributes 
and creates wealth depends on whether it sells or 
gives away its implicit property rights, and 
whether it has a budget for compensating losers. 
The weight of the evidentiary burden of an 
agency depends on its budget for research and 
analysis, the vagueness of its legislative mandate 
(greater detail creates a greater burden of proof 
that a rule carries out the legislative mandate),  
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and the grounds written into legislation as a 
legitimate basis for appealing decisions to the courts. 
Legislation can create identifiable losers by 
specifying rules that cleary hurt someone, rather 
than by delegating the responsibility for writing 
the first generation of rules. 
This paper assumes that political actors are generally aware of 
these characteristics of regulatory policy, and decide to adopt a 
policy having these characteristics because it is in their self­
interest to do so. 
The Theory of Participation 
To identify the conditions under which regulation (or 
deregulation) is a rational political act in a democracy requires a 
theory of citizen political participation. In rational actor theory, 
the focus is on how citizens allocate scarce resources among political 
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activities, assuming that they rationally pursue self-interest. We 
focus on participation in political activities, realizing that there 
are unspecified trade-offs between political participation and other 
ways to use resources. In the sense used here, political participation 
covers a variety of activities: voting, lobbying political leaders, 
contributing resources to parties and candidates, participating in 
policy-making processes (such as regulatory proceedings) ,  and 
initiating legal challenges to unfavorable policies, including 
regulatory rules. 
Imagine each citizen as solving an optimization problem 
involving the use of two scarce resources: time and wealth. The 
citizen's objective is utility maximization, subject to budget 
constraints on wealth and time. Among the arguments of the utility 
function are goods provided by government, whether public or private. 
Entering the budget constraint are factor prices that depend on 
government actions, taxes and subsidies, and contributions to political 
organizations. The time constraint also incorporates allocations to 
political activities. 
Regulation enters the optimization problem in several ways. 
First, regulatory actions affect the arguments of utility functions 
by changing the quality of private goods and the consumption of 
externalities. Second, regulatory actions enter the budget constraint 
by changing factor and product prices. Third, the benefits and costs 
of participation in regulatory policy making must be taken into 
account. This requires making regulatory actions a function of a 
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citizen's political participation, and including participation costs in 
the budget and time constraints. Of course, other policy instruments 
are incorporated into the optimization problem in the same way. 
Although forms of political participation are numerous, we will 
focus on four categories: voting, contributing to parties and 
candidates, taking part in the policy making process {lobbying, 
participating in regulatory proceedings, appealing government decisions 
to the courts) and participating in organizations that engage in 
political activities. This list is not exhaustive; for example, it 
ignores policy research and articles or speeches intended to convince 
voters to favor a policy. For most citizens, however, the list 
includes the important relevant alternatives. 
Voting Behavior 
The most important characteristics of voting are that it is 
cheap and that it is a low information process . Voting consists of 
sending a simple dichotomous signal to parties and/or candidates, each 
of which offers a complex combination of positions and other relevant 
characteristics such as integrity, administrative capability, and 
ideology. Each vote has little effect so voters have little incentive 
to allocate effort and resources in fine-tuning judgments about 
ballot alternatives, other than to the extent that acquiring political 
knowledge is an enjoyable consumer good. 
These features of voting have several important consequences. 
First, voters will pay attention to few issues in an election. Second, 
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most issues will be expressed at high levels of generality, 
incorporating several related policies. Examples are the overall 
performance of the economy, the general state of international affairs, 
the leadership qualities of candidates and party leaders, and ideology. 
More specific issues {health care, education or regulation) can become 
salient issues -- but few will achieve this status. Third, because 
information is sparse, campaign strategies involve providing selective 
free information and establishing the agenda of the debate. 
In this milieu, the rational voter first asks what policies are 
most important to his or her welfare, and then examines historical 
records, information from mass media, interest groups, and candidates 
and parties to decide how to vote. One element of the calculation is 
the provision of government goods -- defense, health care, education. 
Another element is particularistic government activities. Government 
employment and procurement are direct sources of a substantial 
fraction of income. Government also affects income through taxation 
and regulation. Expenditure programs may supply public goods that enter 
many utility functions, but they do so by awarding contracts and 
employing workers. The latter are more concentrated than the former, 
so that winners and losers on the expenditure side have more per capita 
welfare at stake in a program than do most consumers of the public 
good. 
Regulation also has a diffuse impact on the users of regulated 
products, and a concentrated impact on people who earn income in the 
regulated industry. Regulatory cases can be highly particularistic, 
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like procurement, if they apply to a specific firm; however. much 
regulation is more general, consisting of rules to guide case-by-case 
decisions. Rules are in part public goods with exclusion. Part of 
the effect is shared by people whose income is collectively and 
simultaneously affected by them. 
Rational voting decisions must be based on both aspects of 
government. For each person, government will have a shared, diffuse 
effect through general taxation, public goods, and prices of widely­
purchased goods, and particularistic effects, entering primarily 
through the budget constraint. If voters believe that elections are 
equally important in deciding both generic and particularistic effects, 
and possess equal information about both, they will weigh each equally 
in evaluating competing candidates and parties. But the likely case is 
that voters give greater weight to particularistic effects. 
One reason is that voters are unlikely to be equally well­
informed about all issues. Because voters will not bear much cost to 
become informed about an issue in which they have low personal stakes, 
they are likely to have uneven information across issues. In the 
aggregate, the importance of each category of public good may be very 
high; however, for a voter whose income depends on government contracts 
or regulations, the importance of the latter is likely to be 
larger. Hence the incentive is greater to be informed about the 
implications of the election on particularistic affects. Political 
leaders respond to this situation by claiming credit for income­
producing actions of government when communicating with the lucky 
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winners. 
Regulatory policy illustrates these general characteristics. 
If regulation attacks a market failure, it provides diffuse benefits to 
numerous voters. In some cases, such as environmental regulation, 
voters may easily perceive a great stake in the issue; however, most 
regulatory policies are narrow and have a small per capita impact on 
citizens. The per capita stakes of people in a regulated industry are 
much higher. Consequently, when the generic issue of regulatory policy 
is not salient, the income side of regulatory policies will have more 
electoral significance than the correction of market failures. 
The relative importance of particularistic versus generic 
issues in voting decisions is likely to depend on the form of 
government system. Consider two extremes in the spectrum of forms of 
representative democracy. One is separate legislative and executive 
branches, with legislators elected from single-member constituencies, 
such as in the United States and France in the Fifth Republic. The 
other is a parliament elected by proportional representation from party 
lists which are selected and ordered by a central party authority. The 
former provides legislators with an opportunity to be autonomous from 
parties if they are popular with constituents, Collectively, these 
legislators have an incentive to construct a legislative process that 
enables them to provide services to constituents so that they can claim 
credit for particularistic actions (contracts, construction projects, 
etc. ) .  A rational voter will then see a representative as a relatively 
powerless single vote on generic policy issues, but a monopolistic 
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supplier of particularistic favors, as explained in Fiorina and Noll. 
If a legislator functions effectively in this role, challengers will 
face a disadvantage in an election, for their ability to provide favors 
will be conjectural against the proven ability of the incumbent. Thus, 
legislators will downplay their role in generic (and especially 
controversial) public issues, and emphasize their role in obtaining 
particularistic favors. 
In a parliamentary system with nationwide proportional 
representation, the close pairing of generic and particularistic issues 
is inescapable, but here particularism is still a potent political 
force. Voters will still feel the particularistic effects of 
government, and vote in part on the basis of them. Parties will behave 
like individual representatives in the other system, constructing a 
process for dealing directly with particularistic interests and 
communicating particularistic accomplishments. But all citizens will 
have access to alternative routes for particularistic tavors (in some 
sense all parties can supply favors, not just a single incumbent) .  
Moreover, parties, unlike specific legislators, can not argue 
simultaneously that they ought to be in power on particularistic 
grounds and that they are powerless in establishing generic policies. 
In parliamentary systems, single-representative districts are 
more prone to particularism than proportional representation. Parties 
can solidify power by allowing members of parliament to become 
favorites with their districts. One way to achieve this is to make 
them ombudsmen. For example, Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina show that 
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British MPs actually spend more time doing constituency service than do 
members of the U. S. House of Representatives. 
The effect of an independent executive is more conjectural. 
Independence makes legislator& more prone to particularism, even under 
proportional representation, because they are not as accountable for 
generic policies. But an independent President can not rely as much on 
favors for specific constituents, owing to the legislature's function 
in writing laws and making appropriations. 
From the voter's perspective, an independent executive offers 
an escape from the prisoner's delimma created by the legislature. 
Collectively, citizens can recognize that all are better off if 
particularism does not drive government policy. Individually, voters 
are better off voting for candidates and/or parties that supply favors 
to them. A candidate for chief executive, running separately from the 
legislature, can promise to implement the cooperative solution: to run 
against the behavior legislators are prone to pursue. Thus, an 
independent executive has two effects operating in opposite directions, 
with an uncertain qualitative resultant: it makes the legislature more 
particularistic, but the executive less so. The net result depends on 
the details of the separation of powers between the two branches. For 
example, in the Fifth Republic, the President controls the agenda of 
the legislature. This not only makes the legislature very weak, but 
allows the executive to claim credit for every legislative action. 
Consequently, both branches should have a particularistic orientation 
in France. 
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The conclusion to be drawn from voting theory is that 
government is more sensitive to particularistic, distributive issues, 
than to generic effects. Exceptions occur when the performance in a 
specific area of policy becomes sufficiently poor that, as a generic 
issue, it becomes salient. This requires one of two eventualities. 
First, the per capita generic effect becomes high enough to 
become important in voting decisions. Second, an entrepreneurial party 
or candidate pays the informational coats of bringing an issue of 
lesser (but significant) import to the attention of voters. These 
routes are not totally independent; ceteris paribus, a rational 
political actor will pick a new issue according to its per capita 
impact. But they are not the same, either. Elections being relatively 
low information processes, the attractiveness of a new issue to a 
political entrepreneur depends on its amenability to presentation to 
voters in a simple yet dramatic form. Favorites are dollars of gross 
waste, and horror stories about how some group profits at the public's 
expense. 
Voting and Regulation 
The implications for regulatory policy are as follows. Recall 
that regulatory legislation need not create identifiable winners and 
losers. The law can be specific, imposing a cost or legalizing a 
monopoly, or it can be vague, giving regulators and later courts the 
decision as to who wins and who loses. The political context in which 
regulatory policy arises should determine this choice. 
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When regulatory legislation creates identifiable winners at the 
expense of diffuse losers, such as when it creates a monopoly, the 
corresponding electoral state should be that the regulatory policy in 
question has not achieved generic political salience. Thus, 
legislation creating occupational licensing or agriculture marketing 
orders should be the result of pressures from a particularistic 
constituency in the face of ennui in the general electorate. 
When regulation creates diffuse winners at the expense of 
identifiable losers, the electoral foundation should be a salient 
generic issue, probably placed on the political agenda by a political 
entrepreneur attempting to enhance his or her power by creating a new 
public issue with which be or she can be identified. The opposition 
should be relatively weak, disorganized particularistic groups. 
When regulation delegates decisions to a regulatory authority 
and the courts, shifting the battle to another forum. a case examined 
by Fiorina and Mccubbins, a pivotal number of legislators should face 
unavoidable controversy. If the issue is not generic, particularistic 
interests are in conflict. If it is generic, it threatens enough 
powerful particulartistic interests so that the issue creates an 
electoral dilemma for politicians. Conceivably, generic issues can be 
inherently controversial (abortion, monarchy, or the independence of 
church and state); however, market failures usually lead to consensus 
on the desirable direction of regulatory policy. 
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Political Contributions 
In many ways, voting and contributing have the same motive, so 
require little separate analysis. But unlike voting, direct 
contributions to parties and candidates can register intensities of 
preferences by the amount of resources given. They are also more 
likely than voting to relate to particularistic rather than generic 
issues. One reasons is that contributions have a higher threshhold 
level of importance that must be crossed to motivate action. Moreover, 
generic issues pose a more difficult free rider problem for 
contributors than do particularistic issues. The former require 
smaller contributions from a larger number of people because small 
contributions are consistent with the diffuse stake citizens have in 
generic issues. The latter may pose no free rider problem: a 
regulated monopoly or a firm with government contracts views 
contributions as essentially private arrangements with no free-riding 
beneficiaries. 
The role of contributions varies enormously among countries. 
It is determined by the rules regarding campaign expenditures, the 
duration of campaigns, and the relative importance of parties in 
relation to individual candidates, In countries in which campaign 
expenditures are important and individual contributions are loosely 
controlled, the force of particularistic issues is enhanced. Making 
the government the source of campaign resources is not obviously an 
improvement. If expenditures are important in campaigns, incumbents 
have an incentive to control public resources to their benefit, and so 
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to stack the deck against potential political competitors. whether 
ambitious politicians within a party or new parties, Because political 
entrepreneurs bring generic issues onto the political agenda, denying 
them resources can prolong, if not perpetuate, particularistic control 
of an area of policy, including regulation. 
Participation in Policy Processes 
A third form of participation is to enter for1DDS for making 
policy decisions: lobbying political leaders, taking part in an 
administrative proceeding, or appealing legislative or regulatory 
outcomes to courts. Like contributions, these forms of participation 
can reflect intensities of preferences, tor they can be pursued with 
varying cost and effectiveness. Like contributions, they overrepresent 
particularistic interests, 1n part because of a higher threshhold of 
stakes and in part because private actions to alter public policies 
benefit other, similarly situated people and so face the free-rider 
problem. 
Lobbying is most like contributing; indeed the two are closely 
associated. People may contribute to candidates to gain access if the 
need arises, or may promise future resources while lobbying for current 
support, Moreover, lobbying has few rules and no evidentiary 
standards. 
Regulatory and legal proceedings have a strong element of 
substance, Effective participation in these forwns requires 
marshalling facts and logic in defense of a favored position. 
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Consequently, effective participation has a minimum fixed cost, 
depending upon the technical content of the issue and the number of 
opposing positions that are represented. The fixed coats correspond to 
the minimum effort required to marshal! relevant facts and an effective 
presence during a proceeding. Thus, the threahhold of stakes for an 
issue to motivate participation in these proceedings is higher than for 
other forms of participation. Moreover, the free rider problem is also 
more severe. Preparation for participation in a formal proceeding 
requires generating relevant information for presentation to decision 
makers. This information is a public good for all who are on the same 
side of the issue. Hence, participation in these forums faces free­
rider problems on both the cost and the benefit side. 
All of these phenomena contribute to enhancing particularistic 
influence in regulatory policy. Regulatory processes, because they 
stand at the extreme in the number of steps in decision making and in 
formal evidentiary requirements, present the most formidable fixed cost 
barriers to effective participation. But one factor working in the 
opposite direction is that decisions must satisfy higher standards for 
rationality than in other political or bureaucratic processes -­
assuming that regulatory officials actually satisfy them, either for 
some fundamental reason or because a disgruntled loser may challenge 
their decisions in court. 
The relative importance of this feature of regulation varies 
according to how the regulatory process is constructed. One dimension 
of choice is case-by-case versus general rules. If a regulatory 
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authority adopts only vague general policies, leaving most of the 
action to specific cases, particularistic torces are enhanced. The 
objects of regulation -- say, firms engaging in pollution -- have had 
their side of the free-rider problem ameliorated, for each will face a 
narrow case in which its welfare is on the line. The generic interest, 
however, will be diffused over cases, much as pollution results from 
the combined effects of several independent sources. Case-by-case 
decisions will have no effect on the incentive of a polluter to 
participate on the specific issue applying to it, but will 
substantially reduce the incentive of environmentalists to participate 
because victory in one case contributes little to an environmentalist's 
overall objective. 
The case-by-case method also makes it easier for regulatory 
authorities to discriminate among parties. Proceedings that produce 
general rules require the agency to make specific exceptions if it 
seeks to favor a special friend. Thia places a red flag on aspects of 
the decision that are unequal or exceptional. Because more 
participants are likely to emerge in a general proceeding, those who 
seek a special favor are more likely to find opposition. Hence, to the 
extent outcomes depend on participation and evidence, the agency will 
be less able to provide particulatistic tavors. 
Another apsect of agency process is the details of procedural 
requirements and court review, an issue explored by HcCubbins. 
Agencies vary according to number of stages in the decision process, 
formal legal requirements, and grounds on which reviews by courts are 
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possible by appeal -- or even required. Procedural complexity 
increases the costs of participation in ways unrelated to substance. 
It protracts proceedings (increasing the opportunity cost of 
participation and delaying its benefits) and increases expenditures on 
purely representational functions, as contrasted to generating new 
information for regulators. Procedural complexity, then, filters out 
some potential participants whose lower stakes do not justify the 
higher participation costs of a more complex process. 
Still another structural dimension is the availability of 
resources to the agency in relation to the caseload it faces and the 
technical content of its responsibility. Examples of resources an 
agency can possess are a technical bureaucracy for independent research 
and analysis that participates in the agency's proceedings; a 
communications bureaucracy for disseminating information about agency 
rules, cases in progress, and technical issues; and a budget for 
subsidizing participants in its proceedings. An agency that has these 
resources is obviously more likely to generate evidence opposed to 
particularistic interests. 
All of these structural features can be controlled by political 
leaders. Thus, they should reflect the political environment that 
gives rise to regulation. An agency that has cumbersome procedures and 
few internal resources should reflect a political intent to benefit 
regulated firms, or at least to minimize the number of competing 
interests with which the agency must contend. The corresponding 
political situation should include a strong particularistic interest 
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and generic interests that are too diffuse to be represented in 
the detailed design of the regulatory bureaucracy. Generic interests 
organized by political entrepreneurs are prone to this problem. for 
obtaining a change in regulation, not designing its implementation, is 
the simple, dramatic political opportunity. 
The old idea of regulatory capture corresponds to this 
situation. Both particularistic and generic elements are present in 
establishing the agency, but the agency is oriented 
toward the particularistic. By contrast, regulation to form a cartel 
-- say, occupational licensing � requires neither staff nor 
cumbersome procedures. Generic interests play no role in its 
formation, and are unlikely to participate in its processes. 
Politicians have no reason to impose unnecessary 
costs on the cartel, and so make the process as cheap as possible, 
focusing resources on enforcing, rather than writing, cartel rules. In 
the extreme, the regulatory authority need not be governmental. For 
example, as dicussed in Berger, some governments, notably Sweden, 
pursue corporatism, endowing peak associations (labor unions, trade 
associations) with regulatory powers that escape bureaucratic process 
altogether. In the United States, the cartel-like Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC), which regulates surface transportation, gave 
substantial rate-making power to regional trade associations. 
A second situation giving rise to cumbersome procedures and few 
resources is conflict among strong particularistic interests which will 
participate effectively in regulatory processes. Elaborate procedures 
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distance political leaders from outcomes that are offensive to strong 
interests, and sparse resources avoid appropriating funds to produce 
offensive studies. Cumbersome procedures mitigate against 
participation motivated by diffuse or weak particularistic �nterests. 
An example in the United States is the National Labor Relations Board, 
which regulates collective bargaining. In labor disputes, unions and 
management are active participants; cumbersome procedures keep out 
people experiencing secondary effects (consumers, unorganized workers); 
the structure allows politicians to escape blame from losers. 
A process that is rich in resources and procedurally simple 
invites maximal participation, and hence is minimally particularistic. 
It should occur when the political environment finds multiple interests 
that are conflicting, have varying stakes in the issue that make 
participation sensitive to costs, and are each a political threat. 
Rich resources are a response to a salient generic political issue or a 
weak particularistic one. The agency can then provide information that 
otherwise would not be presented. 
The combination of resources and procedural complexity 
represents a response to still another situation. It limits 
participation, and gives the agency more independence of action. Thus, 
it should be a response to conflict between a highly salient generic 
issue and powerful particularistic forces in a situation in which only 
the latter is likely to participate, regardless of representation 
costs. 
The effect of agency resources depends in part on what 
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motivates bureaucrats. The nature of civil service is one i n  which 
opportunities for advancement and, especially, financial reward are 
relatively limited compared to private sector organizations. One can 
imagine three reasons for pursuing such a career: risk aversion, 
leading to a strategy to avoid being noticed and hence penalized; power 
or professionali&11, rather than personal advancement, implying 
independence (perhaps arbitrariness, perhaps pursuit of professional 
norms); or subsequent opportunities, in politics or the private sector. 
An agency satisfying the capture or cartel characteristics would be 
attractive to two types: the risk averse, who seek a quiet, 
noncontroversial arena, and the power seeker who wants to serve the 
particularistic purpose of whatever interest controls the agency. The 
other goals, whether entrepreneurial or professional, require an 
environment in which one can show independence and demonstrate 
proficiency at solving problems. The size of the agency alao will play 
some role. An agency that is rich in resources will be more 
hierarchical to maintain internal control, and hence will offer more 
opportunities for career advancement, within the limitations of 
government service. Moreover, it will have the potential to be a 
mobilizable support group for an internal entrepreneur. 
To a political leader, granting substantial resources to a 
supposedly captured agency is a needless risk. The particularistic 
interests can supply the information necessary to support its position 
in court; any attempt to subsidize the cartel by transferring analytic 
capability to the public budget runs the risk of losing policy control 
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to an entrepreneur or a group with a professional norm of public 
service, however defined ( for economists, surplus maximization; for 
engineers, technical advancement; for lawyers, preservation of equities 
and procedural fairness). Because a strong analytical capability 
invites mischief, rationality requires that it be for the purpose of 
countervailing the force of those most likely to be represented in the 
process. 
Participation in Interest Groups 
Thusfar, the analysis has proceeded under the maintained 
assumption that political participation of all forms is purely 
individualistic rather than collective through an organization. This 
method of argument is intentional -- to demonstrate that 
particularistic tendencies are a natural part of individualistic 
political processes even in the absence of organized interest groups. 
Most of the literature on the political economy of regulation begins 
with the role of interest groups, creating the impression that somehow 
interest groups cause the problem of particularism. This conclusion is 
incorrect; democratic processes create genuine prisoner's deli.mmas for 
citizens that political leaders can exploit to their advantage. 
Nevertheless. interest groups play an important role, especially in 
regulatory politics, so to ignore them completely would be as 
misleading as to focus sole attention on them. 
Interest groups represent a means for collective acquisition of 
public goods -- the political outcome, which is simultaneously 
37 
acquired by the members, and the information and representation that 
are required to affect the process. Group cooperation allows members 
to avoid duplication in acquiring, say, a competent demand analysis for 
submission into a regulatory proceeding. Pooling of resources also 
makes groups a greater threat to decision makers, and hence more worthy 
of their scarce attention. 
From the perspective of participants, groups also have costs. 
First, they must become organized and reach decisions on what position 
to take and how to share costs. Second, if preferences of members 
differ, the positions advocated by the collectivity will be at variance 
with at least some members' most desired position, so that the latter 
will be less exactly represented by the group than if they each 
remained fully independent. 
In addition, interest groups, like all collectivities, need to 
overcome free-riding incentives. Some members will seek to avoid 
joining if they perceive the success of the group to be largely 
independent of their participation and if the group can not exclude 
nonmembers from its benefits. Members who join have an incentive to 
play strategic games in internal decision processes regarding cost­
sharing and position-taking so as to maximize their net gains from 
membership. 
These characteristics of interest groups have important 
implications about the kinds of groups that will be represented in 
political processes, This issue has been extensively analyzed by Olson 
and, for groups in regulatory policies, by Noll and Owen. The effect 
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of groups on regulatory outcomes constitutes the heart o f  the theory of 
regulation developed by Stigler, Posner and Peltzman. Hence, this 
discussion will state only the most important conclusions of this work. 
1. If two collectivities have the same total stake in an 
issue, the smaller one will be more likely to be organized into an 
interest group, all other things being equal, because it will have 
lower organization coats and leas incentive to  free ride. 
2. If two collectivities are otherwise the same, the one 
having greater heterogeneity of tastes will be less likely to be 
effectively organized because it will face higher organization costs 
and, on average, lower expected policy benefits. 
3. If two collectivities are otherwise the same, the one that 
can exclude nomnembers from some benefits of the organization will be 
more likely to become organized and, if both are organized, will devote 
more resources to political participation, because it will have lower 
organization coats and fewer free riders. A corollary is that groups 
already organized for another purpose, such as club-like organizations 
providing private services to members, have an advantage over people 
whose only common interest is a shared political objective. 
4. All other things being equal, a collectivity will be more 
likely to organize effectively if the stakes of each member of the 
group are known with certainty than if they are uncertain. Uncertainty 
enhances the opportunity for strategic behavior in group decision 
making and, assuming risk aversion, reduces the expected utility from 
participation. A corollary is that it is easier to organize to defend 
the status quo than to change it, assuming the expected stakes of 
proponents and opponents of change are equal and the groups are 
otherwise identical. 
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5.  Citizens are more likely to support organizations 
representing particularistic (income-generating) interests or issues in 
which public policy is perceived to be most distant from their ideal 
points (e. g. single issue mass groups) than to groups representing more 
generic interests because the former groups are likely to be smaller, 
are likely to involve a higher personal stake, are likely to be more 
homogeneous, are likely to be organized for another purpose, and are 
likely to provide a relatively certain personal outcome if successful. 
All of the analytical points regarding the identity of 
represented groups bear close similarity to the reasons why democratic 
processes have a strong particularistic flavor. This is not 
surprising, because interest groups are collectivities within the 
national collectivity, and so have similar participation incentives, 
and exist as a vehicle for undertaking more coat-effective political 
participation in that same national process. Lesa obvious is that 
their relative importance depends on political institutions, and varies 
according to the kind of public policy in question. 
Consider first the effect of electoral institutions. 
Nationwide proportional representation, as opposed to aingl e­
representative constituencies, enhances the attractiveness of 
particularistic interests that are rich in electoral resources but poor 
in financial ones; that is, citizens' groups engaged in single-issue 
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politics and containing a small fraction (but large number ) of people 
that are very disgruntled by a specific policy. Such groups have 
little chance of gaining influence if they vote in winner-take-all 
constituencies and make no contributions to major parties or 
candidates, but have a chance if parties are awarded seats on the basis of 
total national votes. If the number of splinter groups becomes large, 
they can become influential because no party appealing to a 
hetergeneous constituency can achieve power on its own. An example of 
such a situation is the role of the religious fundamentalists in the 
Likud coalition in Israel. 
The implications for regulation are certainly not obvious to 
me, but they are unlikely to be nonexistent. Fragmentation of parties 
probably makes a generic movement relating to regulatory policy (or any 
other policy) les s  likely to succeed, but it also increases the number 
of particularistic interests that have power, some of which can 
represent more diffuse opponents of groups that might otherwise capture 
regulation. For example, the Greens in West Germany probably owe their 
political significance to the system of legislative representation. 
They act as a radical counterforce in environmental policy to 
particularistic interests that might use environmental regulation as a 
device for enhancing their wealth by retarding entry. This could 
motivate a party in power to undertake a more balanced and efficient 
environmental policy; but it also reduces the possibility that a 
centrist political entrepreneur might adopt the generic issue of 
efficient regulation as a means for attracting political support. The 
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reason is  that without the Greens, the generic issue of regulatory 
reform would attract some of the Greens' supporters who would see this 
po sition as closer than the statue quo to their extreme 
environmentalist interests. Thus, the presence of the Greens could 
improve the efficiency of environmental policy, but make les s  likely a 
more efficient policy, say, regarding prices and entry in 
telecommunications. 
More obvious is  the difference in regulation and other kinds of 
policies in their sensitivity to particularistic interest groups. 
Weingast, Shepsle and J ohnson have provided a useful model for 
analyzing the relationships between economic efficiency and 
particularism in the standard areas of public policy : expenditure 
programs and the structure of the tax system. The principal insight is  
that political calculations by parties and candidates count some of the 
co sts of a program as benefits -- namely, the income-creating actions 
that help a loyal constituency at the expense of a constituency one would 
not have anyway. Particularistic political benefits are essentially 
linear in dollar payoffs, and are awarded in relation to votes and 
contributions from particularistic interests. This is the process  that 
members of the Chicago School are modeling : regulatory benefits, like 
other government goods, are sold in relation to the amount contributed, 
as explicitly analyzed by Peltzman. This seems to make regulation no 
different than other forms of policy. 
But the straightforward interest-group, supply-demand analysis 
overlooks two differences between regulation and more prosaic means to 
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supply particularistic benefits. One is that regulation constnnes 
resources of interest groups that could otherw ise be spent on parties 
and candidates. The other is that decisions are constrained by 
process and evidence, s imultaneously limiting the maximtnn effect of 
participation and attenuating the connection between politics and 
decisions. 
These aspects of regulation are necessary even if it is purely 
particularistic. Stigler correctly notes that cartels need regulation 
to prevent entry. But this can be accomplished quite cheaply, as with 
occupational licensing or corporatism. It does not explain why 
regulators and regulated f irms are required to devote resources to any 
activity other than licensing and enforcement. 
Compared to other areas of public policy, regulation has a high 
fixed cost of participation, but beyond the expenditure necessary to 
present one's case, decreasing marginal returns to further information. 
Thus, if other interests find it worthwhile to pay the fixed costs 
against a very well endowed participant, the result will not 
necessarily be very closely related to the actual or potential amount 
any group did or could spend in the process. 
This leads to the conclusion that regulation can be either more 
or less particularistic than other programs, depending on the 
underlying politics and representation. Participation has a minimtnn 
efficient scale that depends on how cumbersome regulation is. Hence, 
regulation can be made highly particularistic -- freezing out all but 
one interest. Cumbersome agencies with no significant resources can be 
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used to weaken already weak groups that might have more influence in, 
say, tax or subsidy policies. Nevertheless, we should expect subsidies 
to accompany regulatory cartels and capture : if an interest can buy an 
agency, it can also procure subsidies. In the United States, this 
seems to be born out. The high point of airlines cartelization through 
regulation was accompanied by subsidization; the ICC was created in the 
same era that granted the railroads extens ive rights-of-way from the 
public lands; price and acreage controls in agriculture are accompanied 
by massive subsidies; and the period when the ICC cartelized trucks 
also witnessed federal subsidization of state highway systems. 
By the same argtnnent, regulatory proccesses that are 
battlegrounds among contending interests should not be associated with 
subsidies or other forms of particularism. One does not see. for 
example, a pattern of subsidies and special tax credits for polluters 
in parallel with environmental standard setting. 
A final unique aspect of regulation is that cause and effect 
between policy and the formation of interest groups is partl y  reversed 
for regulation. Regulation provides a means and incentive for creating 
interest groups. 
After regulation has been in place for a long enough period to 
affect the structure of an industry, two phenomena emerge. First, 
expertise at dealing with regulatory, legal and political processes 
becomes important to a firm's financial performance. People who manage 
regulated firms will have a strong interest in preserving the regulated 
status of the industry, even if regulation is not serving the 
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industry's interest, because it enhances their productivity. Prior to 
regulation, these people will not know who they are; however, once 
regulation is in place, they will be a well-defined group that can 
easily organize to lobby for continued regulation. 
Second, because regulation changes market equilibria -- high-cost 
firms are protected, some customer a are charged tavorable prices, 
product quality shifts � firms will have an interest in preventing its 
disruption. Suppliers may not benefit from the regulatory perturbation, 
but they will have investments in place that are predicated on serving 
the market in the way regulation drives it. To protect these 
investments, they will support the status quo because reforms to 
improve efficiency would cause a short-term capital loss. Thus, 
regulatory politics can have the peculiar history that firms fight 
regulation when it is proposed, but then later fight to 
prevent deregulation or more efficient regulation. In the 
United States, truckers fought the adoption of the 55 miles per hour 
speed limit during the energy crisis of 1 973-74, and are now fighting 
repeal of the same 1 111. In the intervening years, lower speeds (and 
the implicit capacity reduction they caused) induced entry, which would 
become excess capacity (and would lower incomes to truckers ) if speeds 
were raised. 
Like subsidies, tax benefits and general expenditure programs, 
regulation provides particularistic benefits, but more than other 
programs it creates interests that are unidentified when regulatory 
policy is enacted. One person's inefficiency, whether a regulation-
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induced cost or a corporate vice presidency for government affairs, is 
another person's income. 
Also like other programs, the force that threatens a 
particularistic orientation of regulation is a political entrepreneur 
who uses inefficiency as an element in raising a generic political 
issue. Regulation is more vulnerable than other policies to this kind 
of attack. In addition to the distributional aspects of particularism 
that it shares with other programs, it creates other costs as well: 
higher production costs, dead..,,eight losses, and procedural costs for 
participants in its processes. Consequently, among particularistic 
policies, regulation stands near the extreme in the difference between 
the losses imposed on losers and the benefits conferred to winners. Of 
the relevant alternatives to regulation, civil litigation is arguably 
the only one that is a less efficient method for allocating wealth. 
This has several consequences. If a subset of losers is 
relatively easy to organize, the difference in impact provides an extra 
incentive to do so that may make the difference -- and thereby create 
the counterforce against particularism. It also makes regulation a 
good target for a political entrepreneur looking for mismanagement, 
inefficiency and favoritism to raise as a generic issue. The subset of 
losers that is organized may help the cause by contributing. 
Hence, protectionist regulation creates the conditions for its 
own reform; at some critical point, the redistributional effects plus 
the inefficiencies become sufficient to cause a backlash. The location 
of this critical point depends on the specifics of the progrsm: the 
46 
size of the losses of the losers, the distribution of losses among 
them, and the ease with which the problem can be simply and 
dramatically expressed by a political entrepreneur. Whether regulation 
can make the list of salient issues also depends on what else is 
happening in the society. Regulatory reform is an unlikely issue 
during a war or period of extreme international tension, but it bas a 
good chance if the international scene is relatively placid and the 
domestic economy is performing poorly. 
A common objection against the self-correcting argument 
described in the preceeding paragraph is that it seems inconsistent with 
economic equilibrium analysis. Why would rational political 
actors institute a policy that caused a reaction against itself? 
Presumably an equilibrium exists, goes the argument, whereby regulatory 
policy supplies exactly the amount of particularistic tavors that is 
just below the thresbbold necessary to induce the reaction against the 
program. 
The reasons that this arg1D11ent does not hold are as follows. 
First, elections and legislatures are majority-rule institutions, and 
these do not necessarily have an equilibrium. To be sure, as Shepsle's 
analysis shows, legislators have means available to protect against the 
instability of electoral institutions, whether the internal structure 
of the legislature in countries in which representatives are autonomous 
or the party system that predominates in parliamentary democracies. 
But these mechanisms delay more than permanently suppress 
disequilibrium. As Riker has cogently argued, the job of the political 
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entrepreneur in the face of electoral instability is to identify new 
issues that will upset the status quo. 
Second, random, exogenous events determine which issues achieve 
general political salience. Only in an expected value sense could 
political leaders calculate the regulatory policy that was optimally 
particularistic. Unless political leaders are extremely risk averse 
(and hence create regulatory policies that are not very 
particularistic), at some point external events would conspire to make 
particularistic regulation a generic political issue. 
Third, a policy reversal in a particularistic program does not 
necessarily disadvantage the political leaders who crested 1t. Recall 
that elections are low-information processes. Candidates do not make 
particularistic favors part of the public rhetoric of a campaign; 
generic issues occupy speech writers. Bence a politician who created a 
particularistic program can later run against it when its effects 
become a generic issue. This is especially likely to be the case in 
nations having independent legislative and executive branches, for then 
generic issues are likely to be fought out in presidential elections. 
For these reasons, regulatory policy can have variable 
characteristics over time. It is unlikely permanently to facilitate a 
cartel; however, 1t is unlikely to be insensitive to organized, supply­
side interests. It is unlikely to be consistently an important 
national political issue or an invisible political backwater. 
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III. SU111Dary and Conclusions 
Regulation was the source of a great deal of cynicism by 
American academics during the 1 960s and 1 970s. The standard view was 
that regulatory policy was an evil conspiracy among politicians and 
select industries to conatruct an enforceable cartel. But at the peak 
of this cynicism, two developments took place that were inconsistent 
with it. One was the rise of environmental, health and safety 
regulation, which target industries almost universally opposed. The 
other was extensive reform and rationalization of regulation: 
deregulation in workably competitive industries that were subj ect to 
economic regulation and mandatory economic impact analysis for cases in 
which market failure is more plausible. 
The political foundations of these changes are built of the 
same bricks that formed the foundations for the protectionism that caused 
the wave of academic cynicism. The same polity that gave the U. S. 
airline deregulation in the 1 97 0s produced airline regulation in the 
1 930s, and a new economic regulatory agency -- for co111111odity futures 
trading -- simultaneously with the beginning of airline deregulation. 
The key to understanding regulation is only partly in the heavy 
participation of organized, supply-side interests in the regulatory 
policy process. This can produce cartelization if others are asleep. 
But the rest of the story is that regulation is an extraordinarily 
cumbersome way to provide particularistic favors. Indeed, because its 
fact-finding and decision-making processes exhibit decreasing returns 
and make decisions depend on evidence, they give other interests as good 
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a chance as one can imagine in a political process. If the agency is 
given policy-making discretion, a simple process, and resources 
adequate to sift through the self-serving material submitted by 
represented interests, regulation is probably as removed f rom 
straightforward pluralist, interest-group politics as is possible. 
Moreover, regulation has the potential for attracting general 
public attention when it goes stale. People genuinely believe the 
rhetoric that regulation is supposed to protect society from market 
failures. This means that they expect regulation to confer net social 
benefits: winners ought to gain more than is lost by losers. 
Regulation is also a sloppy form of cartel; if it becomes one, the 
inefficiencies tend to dissipate the gains of cartel members. This 
means that the losses of the losers are large c1>111pared to the gains of 
the victors, a situation that attracts political entrepreneurs. 
In the economic regulatory sphere. most nations do not engage 
in extensive regulation of the narrow, technical form that is practiced 
in the United States. Among the alternatives is a nationalized entity, 
which suggests parallels to the American postal service: should the 
public enterprise be a ministerial office, directly run by the 
political process, or a quasi-independent authority that is regulated 
by a government bureau? Another possibility is corporatism, which lets 
industry regulate itself with loose ties to government. 
The thrust of the argument in this paper is to favor approaches 
involving an intermediating, resource-rich agency. The reason is that 
the regulatory process provides some opportunity for checking the 
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particularistic pressures that is missing in public expenditure 
programs or administrative methods lacking procedural safeguards. The 
argument of this paper is that. indeed, such a change will take place 
when the performance of ministerial public enterprise or corporatism 
gets bad enough. for some political entrepreneur will eventually sense 
the opportunities in raising the issue. In parliamentary systems 
with single-representative constituencies, like Britain, however, one 
can wait a long time before observing this event. 
With respect to social regulation, the conclusions from 
political economic analysis are as follows. Economic incentives 
taxes and subsidies � are leas attractive than economic theory 
implies. Both are more susceptible than regulation to particularism, 
whether implemented through case-by-case bureaucratic decisions or 
legislation. To be efficient, they must be applied differentially 
among industries and even f irma. which o pens the door to political 
determination of differences. A similar argument applies to greater 
reliance on civil litigation, It has high participation coats and 
requires case-by-case decisions. 
Among the alternatives, the moat promising is artificial 
markets for property rights in exposing society to risks, as examined 
in Noll. This requires a process to define acceptable risk and to 
establish and enforce the property rights; however, markets allocate 
rights among producers of risks. The regulatory component is general 
rule-making; the decisions about how each firm will respond to rules 
are decentralized through a market. The first invites maximal 
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participation; the latter avoids the step in which particularistic 
forces are moat likely to be controlling. Normatively, this approach 
should be superior to current methods of regulation; positively, 
whether they will be adopted depends on how badly social regulation 
performs and how long it takes for the political enviro11111ent to ripen 
so that reform becomes salient. 
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